

## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION IS TO FAMILIARIZE YOU WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT AND THE 1966 PROGRAM.

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS ENGAGED BOTH IN A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE AGAINST THE FORCES OF COMMUNISM REPRESENTED BY THE VIET CONG AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND IN A PROGRAM TO BUILD A NATION. EITHER OF THESE TASKS IS DIFFICULT SEPARATELY, BUT THEY MUST BOTH BE ACCOMPLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONSISTS OF TWO DISTINCT BUT INTERRELATED ARMS:

(1) THE VIET CONG MILITARY APPARATUS CONSISTING OF A WELL EQUIPPED, EXPERIENCED ARMY AUGMENTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES.

(2) THE SECOND PART OF THE INSURGENCY APPARATUS CONSISTS OF VIET CONG ACTIVISTS, TERRORISTS, SYMPATHIZERS, AND COLLABORATORS WHO CONSTITUTE THE EVER WIDENING AND STRANGLING WEB OF SUBVERSION CALLED THE INFRASTRUCTURE.

TO COUNTER THE THREAT, VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES MUST BE DEFEATED MILITARILY; THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL APPARATUS AND TERRORIST BACKING MUST BE ISOLATED AND DESTROYED; PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER MUST BE RESTORED; AND THE PEOPLE MUST BE WON OVER <sup>away from collaboration with VC and threat</sup> TO ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE RURAL POPULATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO THE STRESSES AND PAINS OF WAR FOR MANY YEARS. THE PEASANT HAS BEEN ABUSED AND EXPLOITED BY GROUPS BOTH IN AND OUT OF POWER. AS A CONSEQUENCE, FATALISM AND WAR WEARINESS HAVE SAPPED HIS MOTIVATION; GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, INEFFICIENCY, ABUSIVENESS, AND INDIFFERENCE HAVE REINFORCED HIS DISILLUSIONMENT. TO SOME, CONFLICT HAS BECOME A WAY OF LIFE WITH AN ATTITUDE OF EITHER APATHETIC INDIFFERENCE OR HOPELESS



RESIGNATION. THEY HAVE ACCUSTOMED THEMSELVES TO THE STRUGGLE WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO EITHER SIDE.

IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS, THE PEOPLE MUST ENGAGE WILLINGLY IN THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENSE, SELF-HELP, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IN WAYS THAT ISOLATE THE COMMUNISTS AND MAKE THE PEOPLE STEADILY LESS VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST THREATS OR APPEALS.

TO DEFEAT THE VIET CONG AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BUILD A NATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS ESTABLISHED A CONCEPT WITH THREE MAIN PHASES: A MILITARY OFFENSIVE TO DESTROY THE VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCES; REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TO CONTINUE THE RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT CONTROL; AND NATION BUILDING TO DEVELOP A NATION THAT CAN SURVIVE IN A MODERN SOCIETY OF NATIONS.

WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM THESE THREE PHASES ARE TAKING PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS ADEQUATE SECURITY, NATION BUILDING IS IN PROGRESS. IN OTHER AREAS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS UNDERWAY, AND IN OTHER LESS SECURE AREAS, MILITARY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED.

DURING THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, THE EMPHASIS IS ON MILITARY SECURITY AND MILITARY MATTERS PREDOMINATE. AS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESSES, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AND SECURITY TENDS TO BECOME LESS A MILITARY AND MORE A POLICE FUNCTION, UNTIL IN THE NATION BUILDING PHASE, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS ARE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, THE <sup>NATL SCTY</sup> MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND ALL MINISTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NATION BUILDING.



IN ORDER TO CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE THIS THREE PHASE PROCESS, I WILL TRACE THE EVOLUTION OF CONTROL FROM AN AREA NORMALLY UNDER VC CONTROL TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

FIRST COMES THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THIS PHASE ARE TO:

- (1) DISRUPT AND DESTROY VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCES.
- (2) PROGRESSIVELY CURTAIL AND ELIMINATE SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.
- (3) PREPARE THE WAY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES AND FREE WORLD FORCES FIRST CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TO DEFEAT AND DISRUPT VC AND NVA FORCES AND DENY THEM BASE AREAS, SO THAT COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE UNITS CANNOT INTERFERE WITH REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING PROGRAMS.

IN ADDITION, OPERATIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ARE CONDUCTED BY REGULAR AND REGIONAL MILITARY FORCES TO CLEAR VC FORCES OF COMPANY SIZE OR LARGER FROM PREPLANNED SELECTED AREAS WHERE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS TO TAKE PLACE AND ALSO TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THESE AREAS.

AS MILITARY FORCES ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF SECURITY IN AN AREA, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS INITIATED TO SEPARATE THE PEOPLE FROM VIET CONG CONTROL AND WIN THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. "REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ENCOMPASSES THOSE MILITARY, <sup>political</sup> POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO LIBERATE THE PEOPLE FROM VIET CONG CONTROL, RESTORE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY, AND WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. " IT



REQUIRES COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL PROGRAMS TO RESTORE AND EXPAND GOVERNMENT CONTROL, MAINTAIN SECURITY, AND IMPROVE THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE.

THERE ARE FOUR MAIN TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PHASE:

- (1) DESTROY THE LOCAL VC GUERRILLA FORCES, AND PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY.
- (2) DISCOVER AND DESTROY THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL <sup>apparatus.</sup> AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE.
- (3) REPLACE COMMUNIST AUTHORITY WITH EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE BOTH TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITY.
- (4) MOTIVATE AND ORGANIZE THE PEOPLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND RESIST <sup>cooperate with you</sup> ~~THE RETURN OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.~~ <sup>collaboration with VC.</sup>

PROVINCIAL FORCES, INITIALLY REGIONAL FORCES AND LATER POPULAR FORCES, CONDUCT SECURING OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE REMAINING VC GUERRILLAS AND PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY FOR THE POPULATION. AS THE SECURITY SITUATION PERMITS, REGULAR MILITARY FORCES MOVE ON AND CONDUCT MILITARY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS INTRODUCED IN THE FORM OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE AND NATIONAL POLICE. <sup>? when? what set up?</sup> THESE CADRE MOVE INTO RELATIVELY SECURE

<sup>Enhance our and village security</sup> VILLAGES AND HAMLETS TO ESTABLISH THE INITIAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZE THE POPULATION FOR ~~SELF-DEFENSE~~ AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TASKS, ASSIST IN DESTROYING THE VC COVERT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION, AND INITIATE SIMPLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO HELP WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE.

<sup>Discover genuine + aspirations and pass to authorities;</sup>  
<sup>pick up info on VC recruits + apparatus; pass to mil. (52) and PSB.</sup> } if not action on ...



NOT NECESSARILY

A REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUP CONSISTS OF 59 PERSONNEL ORGANIZED IN FOUR TEAMS AND A GROUP HEADQUARTERS. THIS GROUP IS RECRUITED FROM THE AREA WHICH IT IS TO WORK, TRAINED FOR 13 WEEKS AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, AND RETURNED TO THE AREA. PEOPLES ACTION TEAMS EXPLAIN GOVERNMENT POLICIES, MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE, AND ORGANIZE AND TRAIN LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. THE CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM ESTABLISHES THE INITIAL VILLAGE AND HAMLET GOVERNMENT. THE CENSUS GRIEVANCE TEAM SURVEYS AND CLASSIFYS THE POPULATION, GATHERS INFORMATION, DISCOVERS THE ASPIRATIONS AND DESIRES OF THE POPULATION, AND ? CHOOSES CANDIDATES FOR HAMLET ELECTIONS. THE NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT TEAM ASSISTS THE PEOPLE IN SELF-HELP PROJECTS, INITIATES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS, AND ASSISTS IN OTHER PROJECTS DESIRED BY THE PEOPLE.

BY THEIR ACTIVITIES, THE CADRE ESTABLISH CONTINUING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE HAMLET PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES; AND THEY GUIDE THE PEOPLE TOWARD PARTICIPATING WILLINGLY IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE. THIS CADRE GROUP WILL STAY IN A HAMLET, DAY AND NIGHT, UNTIL THEIR FUNDAMENTAL TASKS ARE COMPLETED - WHEN A NORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IS ESTABLISHED, HAMLET CHIEFS ARE ELECTED OR APPOINTED, AND THE PEOPLE ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.

AS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TASKS ARE COMPLETED, NATION BUILDING BEGINS. DURING THIS PHASE, ACTIVITIES OF A SOCIAL-ECONOMIC-POLITICAL NATURE TAKE PLACE TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF THE PEOPLE. NATIONAL POLICE ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER AND MILITARY FORCES ARE PHASED OUT.



MORE LASTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE UNDERTAKEN  
SUCH AS CONSTRUCTION OF HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS, AND NORMALCY RETURNS.

OUT  
DAMNED  
WORD!

1966 IS THE FIRST YEAR UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S NEW  
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH ITS REVISED CONCEPTS STRESSING  
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO DELIBERATELY WIN THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF  
THE PEOPLE AND INVOLVE THEM IN PROGRAMS FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL  
BETTERMENT.

INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO EQUALLY PACIFY THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS WAS  
ATTEMPTED IN PROGRAMS OF PREVIOUS YEARS, IN 1966 PRIORITY AREAS WERE  
SELECTED WHERE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND ACTIVITIES COULD  
BE FOCUSED.

FOR 1966, THERE ARE THREE GENERAL TYPES OF PRIORITY AREAS:  
NATIONAL, CORPS, AND PROVINCIAL.

THERE ARE FOUR NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS WHERE OVERALL EMPHASIS IS  
BEING PLACED.

IN I CORPS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE - DANANG CITY AREA

IN II CORPS, BINH DINH PROVINCE - QUI NHON CITY AREA

IN III CORPS, THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH EXPANSE

AND IN IV CORPS - AN GIANG PROVINCE

CORPS PRIORITY AREAS HAVE BEEN SELECTED IN I, II, AND IV CORPS.

HERE THE CORPS ARE PLACING SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

EACH PROVINCE HAS A DETAILED <sup>(valid) (invalid) (choose one)</sup> REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR  
1966. IN THESE PLANS THERE ARE PROVINCIAL PRIORITY AREAS SIMILAR TO THE  
CORPS AND NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS. IN FACT, THE CONTROL MECHANISM FOR  
THE CORPS AND NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS ARE THE PROVINCIAL PLANS. THESE



PLANS LIST THOSE HAMLETS IN THE PROVINCE THAT WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL DURING THE YEAR, ESTABLISH MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, AND LIST THE DETAILS OF THE FOLLOWING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS:

RESETTLEMENT	CHIEU HOI
SELF-HELP	IRRIGATION
TRANSPORTATION	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
LAND CLEARING	AGRICULTURE
WAREHOUSES	FISHERIES
EDUCATION	TECHNICAL CADRE
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION	

FOR 1966, APPROXIMATELY 1.6 BILLION PIASTERS OR 20 MILLION US DOLLARS HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED FOR THESE PROGRAMS.

THE 1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BEGAN SLOWLY BUT HAS GAINED MOMENTUM. [EMPHASIS IS ON QUALITY RATHER THAN QUANTITY.] EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL IS NECESSARILY SLOW AND DELIBERATE IN ORDER TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN LASTING EFFECTS. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IS BEING STAFFED TO MANAGE AND CONTROL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF US AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES IS PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SECURITY. TRAINED REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE.

THE PROGNOSIS TO ACHIEVE PROGRAMMED GOALS VARIES FROM POOR TO EXCELLENT. THE AREAS WHERE THE PROGNOSIS IS POOR ARE THOSE AREAS, PARTICULARLY I CORPS IN THE NORTH, WHERE POLITICAL UNREST HAS DISRUPTED REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.



PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS CONTINUES TO BE CONTROLLED BY FOUR FACTORS:

THE FIRST TWO DEAL WITH LOCAL SECURITY - FIRST, THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO FURNISH ADEQUATE VILLAGE/HAMLET SECURITY, AND SECOND, THE ABILITY OF THE VC TO DISRUPT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS.

THE THIRD IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRST - ONE OF THE MAJOR RESTRICTIONS ON LARGE SCALE EXPANSION OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS THE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF QUALIFIED MANPOWER. MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES ARE COMPETING FOR QUALIFIED MANPOWER IN A DIMINISHING MANPOWER POOL.

THE FOURTH FACTOR IS THE ABILITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS TO CONTROL THE POPULATION AND GAIN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN 1967.

THIS COMPLETES MY PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION.

*anticlimatic!*